Female Empowerment through Inheritance Rights: Evidence from India

Sanchari Roy
LSE

Third Summer School on Development Economics
Alba di Canazei

1 July 2008
Research Question

Do inheritance rights empower women by increasing their autonomy/say within their family?
Outline of this talk

- Motivation behind the Research Question
- Related Literature
- Institutional Background of Inheritance Rights in India
- Data and Empirical Strategy
- Preliminary Results
Motivation

Why are inheritance rights an important source of female empowerment and autonomy?

▶ Cornerstone of female empowerment is decision-making authority in the household

▶ Literature identifies the woman’s income contribution to the household budget as key source of such authority

▶ But property (inheritance) rights of women is an important alternative source - parallel to a permanent income shock

▶ Primarily because inheritance rights improve the woman’s “outside options” leading to greater bargaining power and autonomy/say within household

▶ This might have implications for child outcomes like health and education
Related Literature

► **On Property Rights**
  ► Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002), Besley (1995) show that property rights increase investment incentives
  ► Field (2007) shows that property rights increase labour supply

► **On Women’s Bargaining Power, Autonomy and Outcomes**
  ► Rangel (2006) shows that alimony rights improve outside options of women and their influence over resource allocation
  ► Jensen and Oster (2007) show that introduction of cable television improved women’s status in India
  ► Duflo (2003) finds that pensions received by women had a significant impact on the anthropometric status of girls, compared to men

► But little empirical evidence on separate effect of property/inheritance rights on women
Institutional (Inheritance Rights) Background of India

Central Inheritance law of India - **Hindu Succession Act (HSA) 1956**
Central Inheritance law of India - **Hindu Succession Act (HSA) 1956**

- Applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. Does not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews.
Central Inheritance law of India - **Hindu Succession Act (HSA) 1956**

- Applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. Does not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews.
- Gender biased - daughters had inheritance rights only to father’s separate property and not to joint family property, unlike sons
Institutional (Inheritance Rights) Background of India

Diagrammatic Exposition: Ancestry

- Grandfather
  - Son 1
    - Grandson 1
  - Son 2
    - Granddaughter 1
Institutional (Inheritance Rights) Background of India

Diagrammatic Exposition: Gender Bias in Inheritance by birth

- Joint Family Property
  - Son 1 (1/3)
    - Grandson 1 (1/2 * 1/3 = 1/6)
    - Total Inheritance = 1/6 + 1/3 = 1/2
  - Son 2 (1/3)
    - Granddaughter 1 (1/2 * 1/3 = 1/6)
    - Total Inheritance = 1/6
  - Grandson 1 (1/3)
Institutional (Inheritance Rights) Background of India

Why is such gender inequality an important issue?
Why is such gender inequality an important issue?

- Potential to use law to disinherit daughters
  1. if the father renounced his rights in the coparcenary (joint) property
  2. if the father willed his share in the coparcenary to his sons
  3. if the father converted his self-acquired property to coparcenary property

In India, a lot of property is held in the form of immovables like land which is family owned - hence gender bias significant.
Institutional (Inheritance Rights) Background of India

Why is such gender inequality an important issue?

▶ Potential to use law to disinherit daughters
   1. if the father renounced his rights in the coparcenary (joint) property
   2. if the father willed his share in the coparcenary to his sons
   3. if the father converted his self-acquired property to coparcenary property

▶ In India, a lot of property is held in the form of immovables like land which is family owned - hence gender bias significant
State Amendments to HSA 1956

But only if they were still unmarried at the time of the reform.
Institutional (Inheritance Rights) Background of India

State Amendments to HSA 1956


Following these amendments, daughters were given independent inheritance rights, equal with their brothers, in joint family property. But only if they were still unmarried at the time of the reform.
Institutional (Inheritance Rights) Background of India

State Amendments to HSA 1956

- Following these amendments, daughters were given *independent* inheritance rights, equal with their brothers, in joint family property
State Amendments to HSA 1956


- Following these amendments, daughters were given *independent* inheritance rights, equal with their brothers, in joint family property

- But only if they were still *unmarried* at the time of the reform
I use the Demographic and Health Survey which in case of India is called the National Family and Health Survey, 2005-06 wave.

Sample (representative at the state level) consists of around 28,000 ever-married women between the age of 15-49 in 29 states of India, with year of marriage varying from 1964-2004.

Information on age, education, religion, caste, general awareness etc. of these women (as well as their husbands) as well as answers to some “autonomy” questions.
Empirical Strategy

- I use the variation generated by the specification of the law - religion and year of marriage
Empirical Strategy

- I use the variation generated by the specification of the law - religion and year of marriage
- Only applied if the woman was Hindu or Sikh or Jain or Buddhist
Empirical Strategy

- I use the variation generated by the specification of the law - religion and year of marriage
- Only applied if the woman was Hindu or Sikh or Jain or Buddhist
- Also, reform applies to a woman only if she marries after the amendment was passed in her state (if at all)
Empirical Strategy

- The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{is\tau} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \] (1)
Empirical Strategy

- The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{is\tau} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \] (1)

- Dependent variable \( a_{is\tau} \) is “autonomy”
Empirical Strategy

- The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{i\tau} = \alpha_{i\tau} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{i\tau} \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

- Dependent variable \( a_{i\tau} \) is “autonomy”
- Survey asks questions like:
  1. “Are you allowed to go to the market alone?”
  2. “Are you allowed to go to health care facility alone?”
  3. “Are you allowed to go outside the village/community alone?”
- Answers are “yes, alone”, “only with someone else”, and “not at all”
Empirical Strategy

- The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{isT} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{iT} + \gamma R_{sT} + \delta R_{sT} \cdot H_{i} + \mu x_{i} + \epsilon_{isT} \] (1)

- Dependent variable \( a_{isT} \) is “autonomy”

- Survey asks questions like:
  1. “Are you allowed to go to the market alone?”
  2. “Are you allowed to go to health care facility alone?”
  3. “Are you allowed to go outside the village/community alone?”

- Answers are “yes, alone”, “only with someone else”, and “not at all”

- Survey asks explicit questions on household decision-making as well
Empirical Strategy

- The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{isT} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{iT} + \gamma R_{sT} + \delta R_{sT} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{isT} \]  

(2)
Empirical Strategy

▶ The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{is\tau} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \] (2)

▶ Construct dummy variables for each question, 1 if first answer, 0 if otherwise

▶ The “autonomy” variable is the sum of these dummies
Empirical Strategy

- The main econometric specification is:

  \[ a_{isT} = \alpha_i + \beta_{iT} + \gamma R_{ST} + \delta R_{ST} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{isT} \]  

- Construct dummy variables for each question, 1 if first answer, 0 if otherwise
- The “autonomy” variable is the sum of these dummies
- Construct R (denoting reform) = 1 if year of marriage ≥ year of reform in amending state
- Construct H (denoting religion) = 1 if religion = Hindu, Sikh, Jain, Buddhist
Empirical Strategy

- The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{is\tau} = \alpha_is + \beta_i\tau + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

- Construct dummy variables for each question, 1 if first answer, 0 if otherwise
- The “autonomy” variable is the sum of these dummies
- Construct R (denoting reform) = 1 if year of marriage ≥ year of reform in amending state
- Construct H (denoting religion) = 1 if religion = Hindu, Sikh, Jain, Buddhist
- \( x_i \) denotes individual level controls like age, education, media exposure, employment, caste, partner’s occupation etc.
The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{is\tau} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \]  

(3)

**Empirical Strategy**

- The main coefficient of interest
- Identification strategy: exposure to the amended inheritance rights jointly determined by a woman's year of marriage and religion
- However, state-specific time trends could create biased estimates
Empirical Strategy

The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{is\tau} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_{i} + \mu x_{i} + \epsilon_{is\tau} \] (3)

\( \delta \) is the main coefficient of interest
Empirical Strategy

- The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{is\tau} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \] (3)

- \( \delta \) is the main coefficient of interest

- Identification strategy: exposure to the amended inheritance rights jointly determined by a woman’s year of marriage and religion

However, state-specific time trends could create biased estimates
Empirical Strategy

- The main econometric specification is:

\[ a_{is\tau} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

- \( \delta \) is the main coefficient of interest

- Identification strategy: exposure to the amended inheritance rights jointly determined by a woman’s year of marriage and religion

- However, state-specific time trends could create biased estimates
Empirical Strategy

- Hence new econometric specification is:

\[ a_{ist} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{st} + \delta R_{st} \cdot H_i + \lambda_s \tau + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \] (4)

- State-specific linear trends \( \lambda_s \)
Empirical Strategy

- Hence new econometric specification is:

\[ a_{ist} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \lambda_{s\tau} + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \quad (4) \]

- State-specific linear trends \( \lambda_s \)

- Still, unobserved non-linear state specific time effects may exist, so I put in state-year of marriage FE

\[ a_{ist} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \pi_{s\tau} + \delta R_{s\tau} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{is\tau} \quad (5) \]
Empirical Strategy

- Hence new econometric specification is:

\[ a_{ist} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \gamma R_{st} + \delta R_{st} \cdot H_i + \lambda_s \tau + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{ist} \] (4)

- State-specific linear trends \( \lambda_s \)

- Still, unobserved non-linear state specific time effects may exist, so I put in state-year of marriage FE

\[ a_{ist} = \alpha_{is} + \beta_{i\tau} + \pi_{st} + \delta R_{st} \cdot H_i + \mu x_i + \epsilon_{ist} \] (5)

- No longer able to separately identify the level effect of the reform
## Summary Statistics

### Table 1

**Summary Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>28746</td>
<td>1.748</td>
<td>1.272</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>28746</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>28737</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>28746</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>28713</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>28713</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>28713</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>28713</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>28713</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jain</td>
<td>28713</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>28713</td>
<td>0.00010</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>28746</td>
<td>33.511</td>
<td>7.540</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>28746</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>28746</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>28746</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>28746</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>28698</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>28018</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>28018</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>28018</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regression Results for Religion

Table 2
Effect of Reform on Women’s Autonomy - Religion (No Controls)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reform*Religion</td>
<td>0.246***</td>
<td>0.246***</td>
<td>0.232***</td>
<td>0.232***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0831)</td>
<td>(0.0701)</td>
<td>(0.0851)</td>
<td>(0.0722)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>-0.215***</td>
<td>-0.215***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0830)</td>
<td>(0.0543)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State linear trends</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State*Year of Marriage FE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster at state level</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>28088</td>
<td>28088</td>
<td>28088</td>
<td>28088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3

**Effect of Reform on Women’s Autonomy - Religion (With Controls)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reform</strong></td>
<td>0.235***</td>
<td>0.235***</td>
<td>0.225***</td>
<td>0.225***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0815)</td>
<td>(0.0615)</td>
<td>(0.0835)</td>
<td>(0.0692)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reform</strong></td>
<td>-0.221***</td>
<td>-0.221***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0814)</td>
<td>(0.0437)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.0201***</td>
<td>0.0201***</td>
<td>0.0201***</td>
<td>0.0201***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00234)</td>
<td>(0.00355)</td>
<td>(0.00238)</td>
<td>(0.00347)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Education</strong></td>
<td>0.0376*</td>
<td>0.0376</td>
<td>0.0239</td>
<td>0.0239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0227)</td>
<td>(0.0352)</td>
<td>(0.0231)</td>
<td>(0.0306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Education</strong></td>
<td>0.105***</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
<td>0.0966***</td>
<td>0.0966***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0243)</td>
<td>(0.0296)</td>
<td>(0.0247)</td>
<td>(0.0317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher Education</strong></td>
<td>0.456**</td>
<td>0.456**</td>
<td>0.435**</td>
<td>0.435**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0407)</td>
<td>(0.0679)</td>
<td>(0.0415)</td>
<td>(0.0675)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employed</strong></td>
<td>0.251***</td>
<td>0.251***</td>
<td>0.250***</td>
<td>0.250***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0157)</td>
<td>(0.0312)</td>
<td>(0.0160)</td>
<td>(0.0338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husband = Professional/Managerial</strong></td>
<td>-0.0580</td>
<td>-0.0580</td>
<td>-0.0334</td>
<td>-0.0334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0672)</td>
<td>(0.0694)</td>
<td>(0.0698)</td>
<td>(0.0784)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husband = Clerical</strong></td>
<td>-0.0965</td>
<td>-0.0965</td>
<td>-0.0352</td>
<td>-0.0352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0692)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.0718)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husband = Sales</strong></td>
<td>-0.119*</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>-0.0604</td>
<td>-0.0604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0654)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.0679)</td>
<td>(0.0958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husband = Agri</strong></td>
<td>-0.285***</td>
<td>-0.285***</td>
<td>-0.240***</td>
<td>-0.240***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0637)</td>
<td>(0.0885)</td>
<td>(0.0662)</td>
<td>(0.0841)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husband = Services</strong></td>
<td>-0.0436</td>
<td>-0.0436</td>
<td>-0.00167</td>
<td>-0.00167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0684)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.0709)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husband = Manual</strong></td>
<td>-0.0707</td>
<td>-0.0707</td>
<td>-0.0160</td>
<td>-0.0160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0634)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.0659)</td>
<td>(0.0971)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**State linear trends**  YES  YES  NO  NO
**State*Year of Marriage FE**  NO  NO  YES  YES
**Cluster at state level**  NO  YES  NO  YES
**R-squared**  0.710  0.710  0.722  0.722
**No. of Observations**  27679  27679  27679  27679
Table 3 indicates that autonomy status of women whose husbands are agriculturalists particularly low.
Landholdings

- Table 3 indicates that autonomy status of women whose husbands are agriculturalists particularly low
- Does the woman’s potential of inheriting asset that is complementary to her husband’s occupation change this?
- This makes sense as a lot of jointly held property is land
Landholdings

- Table 3 indicates that autonomy status of women whose husbands are agriculturalists particularly low
- Does the woman’s potential of inheriting asset that is complementary to her husband’s occupation change this?
- This makes sense as a lot of jointly held property is land
- Complementarity - consumption smoothing, agri practices
Table 3 indicates that autonomy status of women whose husbands are agriculturalists particularly low.

Does the woman’s potential of inheriting asset that is complementary to her husband’s occupation change this?

This makes sense as a lot of jointly held property is land.

Complementarity - consumption smoothing, agri practices.

I use land ownership of husband as indicator for his agricultural occupation.
## Regression Results for Land

### Table 4

**Effect of Reform on Women’s Autonomy - Land**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reform*Land</td>
<td>0.182*</td>
<td>0.227**</td>
<td>0.143*</td>
<td>0.181**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.0763)</td>
<td>(0.0725)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0209***</td>
<td>0.0195***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00343)</td>
<td>(0.00345)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>0.0316</td>
<td>0.0343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0295)</td>
<td>(0.0355)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.122***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0296)</td>
<td>(0.0415)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>0.444***</td>
<td>0.470***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0663)</td>
<td>(0.0619)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.268***</td>
<td>0.255***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0356)</td>
<td>(0.0306)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband = Professional/Managerial</td>
<td>-0.0291</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0726)</td>
<td>(0.0703)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband = Clerical</td>
<td>-0.0366</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0983)</td>
<td>(0.0969)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband = Sales</td>
<td>-0.0687</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0861)</td>
<td>(0.0953)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband = Agriculture</td>
<td>-0.233***</td>
<td>-0.327***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0780)</td>
<td>(0.0830)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband = Services</td>
<td>0.00137</td>
<td>-0.0946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband = Manual</td>
<td>-0.0254</td>
<td>-0.0919</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0903)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_1=1$ sample</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster(state)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>0.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>28400</td>
<td>22369</td>
<td>27679</td>
<td>22123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some Identification Concerns

- Unobserved individual heterogeneity pushes women to choose landed husbands and also to have greater autonomy in her marital family (ability?)
- Unobservables could induce women to defer their marriage and also to have greater autonomy
Conclusions

- The reform on inheritance rights in India seems to increase the autonomy of women.
- The effect is also positive for the women whose husbands’ occupation is complementary to the form of property inherited.
- Also, among them this effect is stronger for those women who belong to the “correct” religions, thus strengthening the first finding.