

Resource Allocation via the Median Rule

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The presentation is based on a (preliminary) working paper Nehring and Puppe (2017). The background is the theory of strategy-proof social choice on generalized single-peaked preferences developed by Klaus and myself in Nehring and Puppe (2007, 2010). The present proposal refines the notion of the *Condorcet set* introduced in Nehring, Pivato and Puppe (2014), see in particular Section 3.4 of that paper. The results of the simulation studies come from joint work of Klaus with Tobias Lindner (Lindner 2011, in German). Experimental results on the median rule and closely related allocation rules can be found in Part III of the dissertation Block (2014) and in the working paper Rollmann (2016).

Block, V., „Single-Peaked Preferences. Extensions, Empirics and Experimental Results,“ Ph.D. Dissertation, KIT, February 2014. Available online at:
<https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000041208>

Lindner, T., „Zur Manipulierbarkeit der Allokation öffentlicher Güter – Theoretische Analyse und Simulationsergebnisse,“ Ph.D. Dissertation, KIT, June 2011, Available online at:
<https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000023589>

Nehring, K. and C. Puppe, „The Structure of Strategy-Proof Social Choice. Part I: General Characterization and Possibility Results on Median Spaces,“ *Journal of Economic Theory* 135 (2007), 269-305.

Nehring, K. and C. Puppe, „Abstract Arrowian Aggregation,“ *Journal of Economic Theory* 145 (2010), 467-494.

Nehring, K., M. Pivato and C. Puppe, „The Condorcet Set: Majority Voting over Interconnected Propositions,“ *Journal of Economic Theory* 151 (2014), 286-303.

Rollmann, J., „Mean Versus Median-Based Voting in Multi-Dimensional Allocation Problems,“ Working Paper, KIT, October 2016.